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This posting is in compliance of the authors copyright notice. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CERT Advisory CA-2001-02 Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND Original release date: January 29, 2001 Last revised: -- Source: CERT/CC A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file. Systems Affected Domain Name System (DNS) Servers running various versions of ISC BIND (including both 4.9.x prior to 4.9.8 and 8.2.x prior to 8.2.3; 9.x is not affected) and derivatives. Because the normal operation of most services on the Internet depends on the proper operation of DNS servers, other services could be impacted if these vulnerabilities are exploited. Overview The CERT/CC has recently learned of four vulnerabilities spanning multiple versions of the Internet Software Consortium's (ISC) Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) server. BIND is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) that is maintained by the ISC. Because the majority of name servers in operation today run BIND, these vulnerabilities present a serious threat to the Internet infrastructure. Three of these vulnerabilities (VU#196945, VU#572183, and VU#868916) were discovered by the COVERT Labs at PGP Security, who have posted an advisory regarding these issues at http://www.pgp.com/research/covert/advisories/047.asp The fourth vulnerability (VU#325431) was discovered by Claudio Musmarra. The Internet Software Consortium has posted information about all four vulnerabilities at http://www.isc.org/products/BIND/bind-security.html I. Description VU#196945 - ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code During the processing of a transaction signature (TSIG), BIND 8 checks for the presence of TSIGs that fail to include a valid key. If such a TSIG is found, BIND skips normal processing of the request and jumps directly to code designed to send an error response. Because the error-handling code initializes variables differently than in normal processing, it invalidates the assumptions that later function calls make about the size of the request buffer. Once these assumptions are invalidated, the code that adds a new (valid) signature to the responses may overflow the request buffer and overwrite adjacent memory on the stack or the heap. When combined with other buffer overflow exploitation techniques, an attacker can gain unauthorized privileged access to the system, allowing the execution of arbitrary code. VU#572183 - ISC BIND 4 contains buffer overflow in nslookupComplain() The vulnerable buffer is a locally defined character array used to build an error message intended for syslog. Attackers attempting to exploit this vulnerability could do so by sending a specially formatted DNS query to affected BIND 4 servers. If properly constructed, this query could be used to disrupt the normal operation of the DNS server process, resulting in either denial of service or the execution of arbitrary code. VU#868916 - ISC BIND 4 contains input validation error in nslookupComplain() The vulnerable buffer is a locally defined character array used to build an error message intended for syslog. Attackers attempting to exploit this vulnerability could do so by sending a specially formatted DNS query to affected BIND 4 servers. If properly constructed, this query could be used to disrupt the normal operation of the DNS server process, resulting in the execution of arbitrary code. This vulnerability was patched by the ISC in an earlier version of BIND 4, most likely BIND 4.9.5-P1. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that some third party vendors who redistribute BIND 4 have not included these changes in their BIND packages. Therefore, the CERT/CC recommends that all users of BIND 4 or its derivatives base their distributions on BIND 4.9.8. VU#325431 - Queries to ISC BIND servers may disclose environment variables This vulnerability is an information leak in the query processing code of both BIND 4 and BIND 8 that allows a remote attacker to access the program stack, possibly exposing program and/or environment variables. This vulnerability is triggered by sending a specially formatted query to vulnerable BIND servers. II. Impact VU#196945 - ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code This vulnerability may allow an attacker to execute code with the same privileges as the BIND server. Because BIND is typically run by a superuser account, the execution would occur with superuser privileges. VU#572183 - ISC BIND 4 contains buffer overflow in nslookupComplain() This vulnerability can disrupt the proper operation of the BIND server and may allow an attacker to execute code with the privileges of the BIND server. Because BIND is typically run by a superuser account, the execution would occur with superuser privileges. VU#868916 - ISC BIND 4 contains input validation error in nslookupComplain() This vulnerability may allow an attacker to execute code with the privileges of the BIND server. Because BIND is typically run by a superuser account, the execution would occur with superuser privileges. VU#325431 - Queries to ISC BIND servers may disclose environment variables This vulnerability may allow attackers to read information from the program stack, possibly exposing environment variables. In addition, the information obtained by exploiting this vulnerability may aid in the development of exploits for VU#572183 and VU#868916. III. History Since 1997, the CERT/CC has published twelve documents describing vulnerabilities or exploitation of vulnerabilities in BIND with information and advice on upgrading and preventing compromises. Unfortunately, many system and network administrators still have not upgraded their versions of BIND, making them susceptible to a number of vulnerabilities. Prior vulnerabilities in BIND have been widely exploited by intruders. For example, on November 10, 1999, the CERT/CC published CA-1999-14, which detailed multiple vulnerabilities in BIND. The CERT/CC continued to receive reports of compromises based on those vulnerabilities through December 2000. On April 8, 1998, the CERT/CC published CA-1998-05; reports of compromises based on the vulnerabilities described therein continued through November of 1998. The following graph shows the number of incidents reported to the CERT/CC regarding BIND NXT record (VU#16532) exploits after the publication of CA-1999-14: Incidents By Month Involving the BIND NXT Record Vulnerability (VU#16532) Based on this past experience, the CERT/CC expects that intruders will quickly begin developing and using intruder tools to compromise machines. It is important for IT and security managers to ensure that their organizations are properly protected before the expected wide-spread exploitation happens. Exploitation The vulnerabilities described in VU#196945, VU#572183, and VU#868916 have been successfully exploited by COVERT Labs in a laboratory environment. To the best of our knowledge, no exploits have been released to the public. IV. Solution Apply a patch from your vendor The ISC has released BIND versions 4.9.8 and 8.2.3 to address these security issues. The CERT/CC recommends that users of BIND 4.9.x or 8.2.x upgrade to BIND 4.9.8, BIND 8.2.3, or BIND 9.1. Because BIND 4 is no longer actively maintained, the ISC recommends that users affected by this vulnerability upgrade to either BIND 8.2.3 or BIND 9.1. Upgrading to one of these versions will also provide functionality enhancements that are not related to security. The BIND 4.9.8 and 8.2.3 distributions can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/ The BIND 9.1 distribution can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/ Appendix A contains information supplied by ISC and distributors of BIND. Depending on your local processes, procedures, and expertise, you may wish to obtain updates from the ISC or from an operating system vendor who redistributes BIND. Use Strong Cryptography to Authenticate Services Services and transactions that rely exclusively on the DNS system for authentication are inherently weak. We encourage organizations to use strong cryptography to authenicate services and transactions where possible. One common use of strong cryptography is the use of SSL in authenticating and encrypting electronic commerce transactions over the web. In addition to this use, we encourage organizations to use SSL, PGP, S/MIME, SSH, and other forms of strong cryptography to distribute executable content, secure electronic mail, distribute important information, and protect the confidentiality of all kinds of data traversing the Internet. Use Split Horizon DNS to Minimize Impact It may also be possible to minimize the impact of the exploitation of these vulnerabilities by configuring your DNS environment to separate DNS servers used for the public dissemination of information about your hosts from the DNS servers used by your internal hosts to connect to other hosts on the Internet. Frequently, different security polices can be applied to these servers such that even if one server is compromised the other server will continue to function normally. Split horizon DNS configuration may also have other security benefits. References To read more about the vulnerabilities described in this document, please visit the CERT/CC Vulnerability Notes Database: VU#196945 - ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/196945 VU#572183 - ISC BIND 4 contains buffer overflow in nslookupComplain() http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/572183 VU#868916 - ISC BIND 4 contains input validation error in nslookupComplain() http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/868916 VU#325431 - Queries to ISC BIND servers may disclose environment variables http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/325431 To cross-reference CERT/CC VU numbers with other vendor documents via CVE, please visit VU#196945 - ISC BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction signature (TSIG) handling code http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0010 VU#572183 - ISC BIND 4 contains buffer overflow in nslookupComplain() http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0011 VU#868916 - ISC BIND 4 contains input validation error in nslookupComplain() http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0013 VU#325431 - Queries to ISC BIND servers may disclose environment variables http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0012 For information on historical issues involving BIND vulnerabilities and compromises, please visit CERT Advisory CA-2000-20 Multiple Denial-of-Service Problems in ISC BIND http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-20.html CERT Advisory CA-2000-03 Continuing Compromises of DNS servers http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-03.html CERT Advisory CA-1999-14 Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-14.html CERT Advisory CA-1998-05 Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1998-05.html CERT Advisory CA-1997-22 BIND - The Berkeley Internet Name Daemon http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1997-22.html CERT Summary CS-2000-02 http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-2000-02.html CERT Summary CS-2000-01 http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-2000-01.html CERT Summary CS-1999-04 http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-99-04.html CERT Summary CS-1998-07 http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-98.07.html CERT Summary CS-1998-06 http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-98.06.html CERT Summary CS-1998-05 http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-98.05.html CERT Summary CS-1998-04 http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-98.04.html For more information on transaction signatures, please visit RFC 2535: Domain Name System Security Extensions http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2535.txt RFC 2845: Secret Key Transaction Authentication for DNS (TSIG) http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2845.txt Appendix A. - Vendor Information This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this advisory. When vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their comments. Caldera Systems OpenLinux 2.3, eServer 2.3.1 and eDesktop 2.4 are all vulnerable. Update packages will be provided at ftp://ftp.calderasystems.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/2.3 ftp://ftp.calderasystems.com/pub/updates/OpenLinux/2.3 ftp://ftp.calderasystems.com/pub/updates/eDesktop/2.4 Compaq Computer Corporation COMPAQ COMPUTER CORPORATION - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- VU#325431 INFOLEAK - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- Compaq Tru64 UNIX V5.1 and V5.0 *evaluation incomplete Compaq Tru64 UNIX V4.0D/F/G *evaluation incomplete - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- VU#572183 - buffer overflow in nslookupComplain() VU#868916 - input validation error in nslookupComplain() - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- Compaq Tru64 UNIX V5.1 and V5.0 - Not Vulnerable Compaq Tru64 UNIX V4.0D/F/G - *evaluation incomplete. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- VU#196945 - BIND 8 contains buffer overflow in transaction signature handling code - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- Compaq Tru64 UNIX V5.1 and V5.0 - *evaluation incomplete Compaq Tru64 UNIX V4.0D/F/G - Not Vulnerable * At the time of writing this document, the problems identified are currently still under evaluation by engineering. Compaq will provide notice of the completion/availability of the patches through AES services (DIA, DSNlink FLASH), the ** Security mailing list, and be available from your normal Compaq Support channel. **You may subscribe to the Security mailing list at: http://www.support.compaq.com/patches/mailing-list.shtml COMPAQ COMPUTER CORPORATION - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- - ----- FreeBSD, Inc. No supported version of FreeBSD contains BIND 4.x, so this does not affect us. We current ship betas of 8.2.3 in the FreeBSD 4.x release branch, and will be upgrading to 8.2.3 once it is released. Hewlett-Packard Company None of the Bind versions of HP-UX is vulnerable to VU#196945 - problem of buffer overflow in TSIG handling code. HP's Bind 8.1.2 is vulnerable to VU#325183 (infoleak problem). Bind 4.9.7 is vulnerable to both VU#572183 (infoleak problem) and VU#325183 (nslookupComplain() buffer overflow). Fixes are in process. IBM Corporation VU#325431 - Queries to ISC BIND servers may disclose environment variables IBM's AIX operating system may be vulnerable to this "inverse query" exploitation. We are working to understand the technical nature of this exploit; when done, we expect to verify AIX's vulnerability. We will provide updates to this page as we progress [in] studying this exploit. VU#572183 - ISC BIND 4 contains buffer overflow in nslookupComplain() IBM's AIX operating system is vulnerable to this potential exploit in named4. We are working to fix this quickly and we intend to post an emergency fix ASAP. VU#868916 - ISC BIND 4 contains input validation error in nslookupComplain() IBM's AIX operating system is vulnerable to this potential exploit, and is working quickly toward a fix. Sun Microsystems, Inc. Solaris(tm) versions 2.4, 2.5, 2.5.1 and 2.6 contain revisions of BIND 4 Solaris(tm) versions 7 and 8 contain BIND 8.1.2 Sun is working to address the issues in VU#868916, VU#572183 and VU#325431 and will be issuing a Sun Security Bulletin when further information is available. VU#196945 is not present in currently supported versions of Solaris. _________________________________________________________________ The CERT/CC thanks the COVERT Labs at PGP Security for discovering and analyzing three of these vulnerabilities (VU#196945, VU#572183, and VU#868916) and Claudio Musmarra for discovering the infoleak vulnerability (VU#325431). We also thank the Internet Software Consortium for providing patches to fix the vulnerabilities. _________________________________________________________________ This document was written by Jeffrey P. Lanza, Cory Cohen, Ian Finlay, and Shawn Hernan. ______________________________________________________________________ This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-02.html ______________________________________________________________________ CERT/CC Contact Information Email: cert at cert.org Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information. Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site http://www.cert.org/ To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to majordomo at cert.org. Please include in the body of your message subscribe cert-advisory * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. ______________________________________________________________________ NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. _________________________________________________________________ Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University. Revision History January 29, 2001: Initial release -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBOnV6WQYcfu8gsZJZAQEwBgP/Q4wJSPaRUHkZyAV0LNEO6DPijeAplZ4u SYbgjXRlSlnnb3msGF3ZNKk0jp7kV2eF5i+Xu79RKrlohHl4iQ5Tgj1G9XcWdbcW wtI4jV5Ozs2UzNHOWuJp9hbfyj/wnjUErHjsFTHT+dzEAaWQSgsl1GFbXHRR0hNh okXWHhmPXiM= =jiwF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- - Subcription/unsubscription/info requests: send e-mail with "subscribe", "unsubscribe", or "info" on the first line of the message body to discuss-request at blu.org (Subject line is ignored).
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