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Why are these coming to discuss at Blu.org? I get CERTs e-mail allready as well as about 10 others... -Kris On Tue, 8 May 2001, Brian Bay wrote: > CERT Advisory CA-2001-11 sadmind/IIS Worm > > Original release date: May 08, 2001 > Last revised: -- > Source: CERT/CC > > A complete revision history is at the end of this file. > > Systems Affected > > * Systems running unpatched versions of Microsoft IIS > * Systems running unpatched versions of Solaris up to, and > including, Solaris 7 > > Overview > > The CERT/CC has received reports of a new piece of > self-propagating > malicious code (referred to here as the sadmind/IIS worm). The > worm > uses two well-known vulnerabilities to compromise systems and > deface > web pages. > > I. Description > > Based on preliminary analysis, the sadmind/IIS worm exploits a > vulnerability in Solaris systems and subsequently installs > software to > attack Microsoft IIS web servers. In addition, it includes a > component > to propagate itself automatically to other vulnerable Solaris > systems. > It will add "+ +" to the .rhosts file in the root user's home > directory. Finally, it will modify the index.html on the host > Solaris > system after compromising 2,000 IIS systems. > > To compromise the Solaris systems, the worm takes advantage of > a > two-year-old buffer overflow vulnerability in the Solstice > sadmind > program. For more information on this vulnerability, see > > http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/28934 > http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html > > After successfully compromising the Solaris systems, it uses a > seven-month-old vulnerability to compromise the IIS systems. > For > additional information about this vulnerability, see > > http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677 > > Solaris systems that are successfully compromised via the worm > exhibit > the following characteristics: > > * > Sample syslog entry from compromised Solaris system > > May 7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: > Bus Error - c > ore dumped > May 7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time > May 7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time > May 7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: > Segmentation > Fault - core dumped > May 7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time > May 7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: > Segmentation > Fault - core dumped > May 7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: > Hangup > May 7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time > May 7 02:44:14 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: > Killed > * A rootshell listening on TCP port 600 > * Existence of the directories > > * /dev/cub contains logs of compromised machines > * /dev/cuc contains tools that the worm uses to operate and > propagate > > Running processes of the scripts associated with the worm, > such as > the following: > * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/sadmin.sh > * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 111 > * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 80 > * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/uniattack.sh > * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/time.sh > * /usr/sbin/inetd -s /tmp/.f > * /bin/sleep 300 > > Microsoft IIS servers that are successfully compromised > exhibit the > following characteristics: > > * Modified web pages that read as follows: > fuck USA Government > fuck PoizonBOx > contact:sysadmcn at yahoo.com.cn > * > Sample Log from Attacked IIS Server > > 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \ > GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir 200 - > 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \ > GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir+..\ > 200 - > 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \ > GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe \ > /c+copy+\winnt\system32\cmd.exe+root.exe 502 - > 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \ > GET /scripts/root.exe /c+echo+\ > <HTML code inserted here>.././index.asp 502 - > > II. Impact > > Solaris systems compromised by this worm are being used to > scan and > compromise other Solaris and IIS systems. IIS systems > compromised by > this worm can suffer modified web content. > > Intruders can use the vulnerabilities exploited by this worm > to > execute arbitrary code with root privileges on vulnerable > Solaris > systems, and arbitrary commands with the privileges of the > IUSR_machinename account on vulnerable Windows systems. > > We are receiving reports of other activity, including one > report of > files being destroyed on the compromised Windows machine, > rendering > them unbootable. It is unclear at this time if this activity > is > directly related to this worm. > > III. Solutions > > Apply a patch from your vendor > > A patch is available from Microsoft at > > > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-078.asp > > For IIS Version 4: > > http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/nts/downloads/critical/q26986 > 2/default.asp > > For IIS Version 5: > > http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/critical/q269862 > /default.asp > > Additional advice on securing IIS web servers is available > from > > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/iis5chk.asp > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools.asp > > Apply a patch from Sun Microsystems as described in Sun > Security > Bulletin #00191: > > > http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=se > cbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba > > Appendix A. Vendor Information > > Microsoft Corporation > > The following documents regarding this vulnerability are > available > from Microsoft: > > > http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-023.asp > > Sun Microsystems > > Sun has issued the following bulletin for this vulnerability: > > > http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=se > cbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba > > References > > 1. Vulnerability Note VU#111677: Microsoft IIS 4.0 / 5.0 > vulnerable > to directory traversal via extended unicode in url > (MS00-078) > http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677 > 2. CERT Advisory CA-1999-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice > AdminSuite Daemon sadmind > http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html > > Authors: Chad Dougherty, Shawn Hernan, Jeff Havrilla, Jeff > Carpenter, > Art Manion, Ian Finlay, John Shaffer > > ______________________________________________________________________ > > This document is available from: > http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-11.html > > ______________________________________________________________________ > > CERT/CC Contact Information > > Email: cert at cert.org > Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) > Fax: +1 412-268-6989 > Postal address: > CERT Coordination Center > Software Engineering Institute > Carnegie Mellon University > Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 > U.S.A. > > CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / > EDT(GMT-4) > Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during > other > hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. > > Using encryption > > We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by > email. > Our public PGP key is available from > > http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key > > If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for > more > information. > > Getting security information > > CERT publications and other security information are available > from > our web site > > http://www.cert.org/ > > To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and > bulletins, > send email to majordomo at cert.org. Please include in the body > of your > message > > subscribe cert-advisory > > * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the > U.S. > Patent and Trademark Office. > > ______________________________________________________________________ > > NO WARRANTY > Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the > Software > Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. > Carnegie > Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either > expressed or > implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, > warranty of > fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, > exclusivity or > results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon > University > does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom > from > patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. > > _________________________________________________________________ > > Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information > > Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University. > > Revision History > May 08, 2001: Initial Release > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > gpg: Warning: using insecure memory! > gpg: Signature made Tue 08 May 2001 12:46:36 AM EDT using RSA key ID 20B19259 > gpg: Can't check signature: public key not found > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- Kris Loranger kris at kancer.978.org IRC:undernet,#978,Kancer AIM:KancerKris "If you're going to sell out, sell out ethically" -Moby - Subcription/unsubscription/info requests: send e-mail with "subscribe", "unsubscribe", or "info" on the first line of the message body to discuss-request at blu.org (Subject line is ignored).
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