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On Fri, Sep 01, 2006 at 11:13:22AM -0400, V. Alex Brennen wrote: > Yes. However, it would have been best practice to generate a new key > pair before the old key pair expired. Then, to use the old key pair > to sign the new key pair there by linking it into the web of trust. > > After doing that, you could have mailed all of the people who signed > your old key in the past requesting that they sign the new key. Upon > receiving a note with a signature from a key that they explicitly trust, > or with a signature from a key signed by a key that they explicitly > trust, they should be willing to trust the new key enough to sign it. > > There is nothing inherently wrong with extending the key's expiration > date. But, I think that before some one does that they should > themselves - "What has changed about the threat model that I now trust > this key to be valid for a longer period of time than I did when I first > generated it?" Historically, cryptographic algorithms, protocols, and > systems have always gotten easier to break over time. > > Additionally, it's beneficial to change keys every few years because > if a key is ever compromised only the signatures for a limited amount > of time are compromised. The compromise is limited to the amount of > time that you had used that specific compromised key, rather than > every signature that you've ever made. [snip] Interesting thoughts. But another group of GnuPG gurus (<http://keyring.debian.org/replacing_keys.html>) suggests simply updating the original key. Are they right, wrong, or just different? -- This message has been scanned for viruses and dangerous content by MailScanner, and is believed to be clean.
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