Encryption and risk

[richard.pieri-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w at public.gmane.org (Richard Pieri)]

On Oct 6, 2009, at 10:27 AM, Dan Ritter wrote:
> Everyone seems to be ignoring the real brute force attack:
> rubber-hose cryptanalysis.

I did not ignore it; I simply chose not to address it.  But since you  
asked... :)

Obviously, no algorithm can be proof against a rubber hose attack.   
Securing against rubber hoses is a matter of implementation.  One  
possible mechanism is something similar to standard code signing  
practice with multi-factor authentication.  The user has a pass phrase  
(virtual key).  The site has a hard token of some sort.  That token is  
stored in a secured area (physical key).  The user does not have  
access to said secured area and must make a request through physical  
security to sign out the token and sign it back in after the code  
signing is complete.  And, of course, physical security monitors the  
checked-out token at all times.

--Rich P.