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Drew Van Zandt wrote: | I think if I were designing the perfect password requirements, it would | look something like: | * IT has a password-crack server with a good dictionary, which includes | names, sports teams, etc., all the trimmings a good password crack attempt | needs. | * No stupid password rules, but the server rolls through and tries to crack | passwords, with a focus on new/recently changed passwords. If it finds it, | user has to change their password. Some years ago, I worked on a project where we decided to do this. I collected a number of password-cracker programs, and wrote a little script to feed them all the encrypted passwords in the /etc/passwd file. The users would get messages of the form "Your password is so weak that we decoded it in $t seconds. Your password is: $pswd. We suggest that you change it." This was fairly effective, actually. Except with managers. ;-) But it does nothing about the general problem of our growing lists of passwords, each satisfying a different set of rules for a different account. This is the problem that forces users to write passwords in a location that they can easily get at when they need a password. As long as this is true, security of the passwords themselves will continue to be somewhat irrelevant. -- The fewer jobs a tool is designed to do, the better it does each of them. _' O <:#/> John Chambers + <jc at trillian.mit.edu> /#\ <jc1742 at gmail.com> | |
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