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Daniel Feenberg wrote: > Chuck Anderson wrote: >> Jack Coats wrote: >>> I am guessing someone will either come up with a crack, or will buy a >>> 'certificate' and it will be 'leaked' or otherwise subverted before >>> long. >> >> If that happens, the key will just be revoked. > > How will a motherboard check for revoked keys? Will the vendor add them > to a list in ROM? I can't imagine BIOS vendors will be enthusiastic > about that chore, or be prompt in doing so. Exactly my question. Certificate revocation in browsers was supposed to be handled using a web service, Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)[1], but browsers that did implement it, shipped with it disabled, as they feared the performance impact. (And Google has since dropped support in Chrome.) So the defacto mechanism is maintaining a relatively static list in a file that is part of the browser's installed files and updated when the browser has a security update. Using OCSP pre-boot would be impractical. So that means either the list only gets updated when the hardware vendor originally Flashed the ROM, or issues BIOS updates, or (seems unlikely) Microsoft adds some service to Windows that updates the Flash as needed. Seems like with any of the options, if you are aware of what mechanism is being used, you can fairly easily avoid it on a machine being used exclusively for Linux. The most likely place you'd get tripped up is installing an BIOS update. -Tom 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ocsp -- Tom Metro Venture Logic, Newton, MA, USA "Enterprise solutions through open source." Professional Profile: http://tmetro.venturelogic.com/
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