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[Discuss] web server can't see out but others can see in



On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 06:09:02PM +0000, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote:
> > From: Derek Martin [mailto:invalid at pizzashack.org]
> > 
> > You can't attack a service that isn't
> > there, or can't hear you.
> 
> Why do we care about having a firewall at all?  Why don't we just
> shut off services that aren't necessary?

That is a fine question.  For a single box on a single network
connection, running only one service, you do not need a firewall.  The
only thing that's potentially vulnerable is the one service, and
you're already allowing it through.  Well, OK, there might be some
exotic IP stack bug that causes the world to explode into love when
you send it a packet on port 93432941 with just the right flags set,
so you need it for that -- maybe.  But then, what's so wrong with the
world exploding into love? =8^)

> To offer some protection against situations where you didn't intend
> for a service to be on.  

On a professionally managed box?  I hope not.  Your admins should be
able to figure out if they're running any services they didn't intend
to, and that should be a condition for deploying your new server.
Yes, it's an extra layer of protection, but if you're doing your job
right, it doesn't really DO anything, except maybe make people feel
better.

> Or - Sometimes there will be a vulnerability in one service that
> allows an attacker to create files on your system, while a
> vulnerability in some other service allows an attacker to execute
> code of some pre-existing file, etc.  

This is probably also not the reason you're running a firewall.
Unless you're blocking all unnecessary outgoing connections (and
probably even if you are), once an attacker is on your box, you've
already lost.  And how does your firewall stop an attacker from
exploiting some local vulnerability?

Firewalls are more generally useful because machines behind them also
need to be able to talk to other machines behind them.  So you run a
firewall so that any other services they are running which are used
internally (in your DMZ if you have one) are blocked externally.  But
it's far better to just not allow them to run other services, if you
can avoid it.  Ideally a web server should only ever run one service:
the web service.  But you probably need DNS, SSH, NTP, and some
database connection... maybe on different hosts, maybe on the same
host.  That's what your firewall is trying to protect.  And if you
were really smart, you did also block all outgoing connections, except
the specific ones you need, to the specific machines you need, and
then maybe you really did block that attacker that got onto your box
from doing anything too destructive.

But almost no one does that... 

-- 
Derek D. Martin    http://www.pizzashack.org/   GPG Key ID: 0xDFBEAD02
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