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On Fri, 07 Dec 2012 17:52:26 -0500 Tom Metro <tmetro+blu at gmail.com> wrote: > I'm confused. This is understandable. Prior to this announcement there were at least four different organizations doing exactly the same thing: Red Hat, Canonical, SuSE and Linux Foundation. I'll admit to dubiousness about whatever Linux Foundation claims to have been doing since most of their spiel has been decrying Secure Boot rather than helping Linux users utilize it. It would not surprise me to learn that they've been intentionally Doing It Rong just to show off how 'evil' and 'onerous' the signing process is. Garrett's shim builds on SuSE's first stage UEFI boot loader, adding a user-managed key store to the boot sequence. Put shim into your boot sequence. Sign your second stage loader with your own key, let shim store that key in its key store. Welcome to UEFI Secure Boot on any operating system you like. This is actually better than what I'd originally described here some months back because it lets you retain a signed trust chain all the way up the boot sequence. Put another way, envision GnuPG. That's what shim is: your keys, your binaries. -- Rich P.
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