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Regarding PRISM: "Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they /aren't/ out to get you." If you remember the 2002 Tom Cruise film "Minority Report", you can get a sense of what the gov't can do with a permanent record of all your personal associations. Today's kids, and apparently those born the past several years, can expect that every interaction they ever had or ever will make is going into a government hard-drive someplace. Their political and personal opponents, if given access to this searchable database, will find it hard to resist going all the way back. Public knowledge that this is actually happening, and isn't just the stuff of paranoid science fiction, will impinge on the 1st-amendment right of association: conscious of such monitoring, people will either associate differently, or not associate at all. I have associated with criminals, only knowing this fact later; many of us associate with them knowingly, as family members or other acquaintances. I've even been a John-Doe defendant in a federal case involving one of them. So it's not just a hypothetical: even if you have "nothing to hide", those around you do. The next shoe to drop in this case, or some future one, that I expect to see: content (as well as pen-register metadata) of SMS text messages is probably visible on the wire that attaches government servers at the big telco data centers. Chances are, it's being recorded in full; Verizon has been quoted in public saying they don't record SMS but they have plausible deniability even if the gov't is keeping such records. And even if Congress were to try to limit duration of such record-keeping, expect that it will be kept for life unless the practice is banned as it is in European countries. The "real criminals" have more motivation than the rest of us to evade this type of monitoring and most already do. So PRISM and other programs are a pointless dragnet that will be usurped for dangerous/corrupt political purposes and repression. I still self-host my email (ever since setting it up in 1993) and relay it through Europe and other places but here are the problems: - Most ISPs block port 25. If that's the case, you need an inbound (and likely an outbound) relay setup. I use separate commercial services for those, and while it's possible to create your own relay site, you'd have to solve the other challenges. - Your outbound email will get tagged as spam unless you can establish a positive reputation for your sending IP address(es). Dynamic addresses won't work, and static ones will only work if they aren't already associated with the types of services that spammers can readily subscribe to (such as cloud services like Amazon EC2). - Spam-control software isn't perfect and requires some care & feeding; if you drop your expectations a bit, it turns out SpamAssassin with a daily rules cronjob is good enough to keep about 99% of spam out without any other updates for years at a time. I use EasyDNS to relay my inbound mail and MailJet to relay most of my outbound on ports other than 25. A slightly-customized postfix and spamassassin installation is all I need for software, and I also use haproxy to make the thing fault-tolerant across two virtual machines. -rich P.S. One court case I have followed at the state level is "People v. Diaz" in the California Supreme Court. If this is upheld at the federal level (which it likely will), it means your mobile devices are subject to warrantless searches and can be monitored by law enforcement. If you happen to be incarcerated at the time, you probably won't be able to activate a remote erase or deactivation command, so inbound communications can be monitored until you regain freedom (possibly long after, if you didn't install a remote-erase app). This applies to everyone regardless of whether they broke the law or are dismissed later. The obvious protection would be device-level encryption but this is unavailable on iPhone and can only protect old data (vs. new data coming in) on Android.
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