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On 08/05/2013 02:49 PM, Richard Pieri wrote: > What harm? The NSA has an effectively unlimited budget. For what values of "effectively"? Even the NSA needs to get money appropriated. Make them put extra zeros on the end and it matters. > If your foes include lesser organizations then maybe you are correct. > It depends on what resources they have to bring to bear. The mass snooping effectively is the "lessor organization" you refer to. There is a world of difference between putting a lot of talent on a difficult target (think cold war, with one or two real enemies) vs. aiming at hundreds of millions of targets...up to billions. Yes, there are billions of us, and they want it all, even the communications of multitudes of poor people in unhappy lands. They are trying to snoop on everything. Little roadblocks matter, if the snoops' responses to the roadblocks don't scale really easily, little roadblocks make all the difference. What does it take to grab all the e-mail running in the clear through ISP X? A good data link to Utah (or wherever), and not that much hardware at key choke points Conversely, what does it take to do MitM attacks on all the e-mail running through ISP X? (And where will you fit all that equipment in ISP X's server room? And where will you get the power? Or do you do it remotely, say, in Utah, with latency and reliability problems undermining ISP X's cooperation? And how many server warehouses would it take no matter where they put it?) These are unchecked bureaucrats. How competent could they be? How easy a task have they had so far? A little monkey wrenching could completely change their cost curve--if widely adopted. -kb
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