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> From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey.com at blu.org [mailto:discuss- > bounces+blu=nedharvey.com at blu.org] On Behalf Of Jerry Feldman > > The main issue is that assuming you encrypt all your outgoing emails, > and most of your respondents encrypt email to you if someone with enough > compute power wanted to decrypt your emails they can do it. And, > essentially it comes down to the cost vs reward. So, the federal > government has the resources but very few criminal enterprises would > invest that much for us. "enough compute power" is basically a millenium of the entire energy output of our sun. If you're using strong encryption, which is a given. There isn't any implementation of weak encryption supported in email encryption anymore - only weak key management. Not even the government has the compute power to decrypt (in general) something you encrypted with a modern digital ID and S/MIME. (The lowest key strength startcom will accept is 2048 bit RSA, and they recommend 4096 bit).
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