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[Discuss] Server/laptop full-disk encryption
- Subject: [Discuss] Server/laptop full-disk encryption
- From: bogstad at pobox.com (Bill Bogstad)
- Date: Wed, 1 Oct 2014 13:41:43 +0200
- In-reply-to: <9c6cf155f2b6480985a30ea427dae562@CO2PR04MB684.namprd04.prod.outlook.com>
- References: <fb73f4b8a491577a02de5fcaf7779293.squirrel@webmail.ci.net> <de529929c36240babe4229ad818da975@CO2PR04MB684.namprd04.prod.outlook.com> <542B5DBC.2090805@horne.net> <9c6cf155f2b6480985a30ea427dae562@CO2PR04MB684.namprd04.prod.outlook.com>
On Wed, Oct 1, 2014 at 12:52 PM, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) <blu at nedharvey.com> wrote: >> From: discuss-bounces+blu=nedharvey.com at blu.org [mailto:discuss- >> bounces+blu=nedharvey.com at blu.org] On Behalf Of Bill Horne >> >> On 9/30/2014 9:38 AM, Edward Ned Harvey (blu) wrote: >> > In linux, I'm not aware of any product that does whole disk encryption >> without needing a power-on password. In windows, Bitlocker uses the TPM >> to ensure the OS gets booted untampered, and then your user logon >> password and OS security are used to prevent unauthorized access. This is >> truly great to protect against thugs and laptop thieves. >> > >> >> No offense, but why would it/ how could it? A laptop thief isn't likely >> to be looking for /your/ info, > > I didn't mean it deters thieves. I meant it protects your data against thieves. There are many situations where the data value greatly exceeds the laptop value - but even when it doesn't - Even if your data is only worth $1, then it's good to limit your loss to the value of the hardware and nothing more. Unlike on-line data thieves who can automate their data collection to attack thousands, actually retrieving data from you stolen laptop will take significant human effort on their part. If there were bootable CDs out there that they could use to scan a laptop for information to sell that might change things, but for now I suspect that even a low bar would be sufficient to deter random thieves from bothering to retrieve you data. There is also the value of their time. If your info is really only worth a $1 to them vs ?? amount of time; are they going to bother? Of course, even though it might only be worth $1 to them, it might be worth much more to you to reduce the aggravation. How much time it will take you and whether you should be willing to spend that time (as insurance) against future loss isn't obvious to me. It seems like whenever people start talking about computer security, there is a tendency to shoot for the maximum theoretically possible. We don't do that when it comes to our cars or homes, but it does with computers. Bill Bogstad
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- From: blu at nedharvey.com (Edward Ned Harvey (blu))
- [Discuss] Server/laptop full-disk encryption
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- [Discuss] Server/laptop full-disk encryption
- From: blu at nedharvey.com (Edward Ned Harvey (blu))
- [Discuss] Server/laptop full-disk encryption
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