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[Discuss] NAS: encryption
- Subject: [Discuss] NAS: encryption
- From: richard.pieri at gmail.com (Richard Pieri)
- Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2015 11:53:35 -0400
- In-reply-to: <20150708150631.GF32011@angus.ind.WPI.EDU>
- References: <5596D8DA.2000201@gmail.com> <55980A9F.4020007@gmail.com> <BY1PR0401MB1641117906253C39D8075681DC940@BY1PR0401MB1641.namprd04.prod.outlook.com> <sjmd203evpz.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <CAFv2jcba50_Kw9V-p7brmeJ5Fk=9rzeQRLRzBUVRK8uZ71wZNA@mail.gmail.com> <BY1PR0401MB164127DEA53006B9692DC60CDC920@BY1PR0401MB1641.namprd04.prod.outlook.com> <3d14590da6e6f0bd76b8e75496117136.squirrel@mail.mohawksoft.com> <559D3884.7010505@gmail.com> <20150708150631.GF32011@angus.ind.WPI.EDU>
On 7/8/2015 11:06 AM, Chuck Anderson wrote: > I think this whole discussion revolves around choice. With open > source, I have a choice to audit the code if I so desire, or to hire > someone to do so on my behalf. With internal drive encryption, I have > (almost) no choice but to trust someone else's judgement about the > implementation, whether that be the manufacturer or the government or > some industry body or nonprofit. Their incentives and my incentives > may not always be aligned. You are not qualified to perform a security audit. Neither am I. Only a handful of people in the world have those chops and most of them work for the NSA and GQHQ and maybe the FSB. The rest charge a great deal of money for their time and expertise, money that you as an individual probably don't have. You only have the illusion of choice. > I say "almost" no choice, because I guess I could reverse engineer the > device. But this is much harder to do than if I had the source code > in the first place. Isn't that one of the major selling points of > open source software? If you are not qualified to audit the thing then you are not qualified to reimplement it. The license is irrelevant. > Even if I do not exercise my choice to audit the code, the mere fact > that anyone can chooose to do so at any time can be a deterrent to > trying to "pull a fast one" and hide malicious code in there. It didn't stop the NSA from compromising Dual_EC_DRBG. It didn't stop Intel from compromising RdRand (likely at the NSA's prompting). It didn't prevent the ProFTPD sources from being compromised. It didn't prevent the OpenSSH sources from being compromised. -- Rich P.
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