[Discuss] Boston Linux Meeting Wednesday, December 19, 2018 - Security: Rogue Device Attacks

[gaf at blu.org (Jerry Feldman)]

When: December 19, 2018 7:00PM (6:30PM for Q&A)
Topic: Security: Rogue Device Attacks
Moderator: Federico Lucifredi
Location: MIT Building E-51, Room 315
Note: Parking at E-51 is now free. See note below

Please note that Wadsworth St is open from Memorial Drive to Amherst St,
but is closed between Amherst St to Main St. See the ling below for
additional details.
https://courbanize.com/projects/mit-kendall-square/updates

Summary:

A live demonstration of hacking with keystroke injection attacks

Abstract:

We will be taking advantage of the inherent trust that computers place
on what is believed to be a regular keyboard to unleash pre-programmed
kesytroke payloads at well over 1000 words a minute. We access the host
system and bypass traditional security countermeasures for payloads that
can include reverse shells, binary injetion, brute force password
attacks, and just about any attack that can be fully automated.

In this session we explore the fundamentals of attacks exploiting the
trust the operating system places on USB human-interaction devices to
demonstrate once again the old principle that if you can physically
access a computing device, there is no real security to be had. I will
review the hardware, its capabilities, how it can be used to breach OS
security, and how attackers can enable it to perform a variety of
nefarious tasks with its own suite of tools. I will then show how to
build and install additional software and customize the device with
binary or scripted payloads.

After exploring the building blocks of USB HID exploitation, we take the
discussion to the next level by altogether removing the need for a
device and exploring what attacks can be delivered directly by a plain
USB cable. We dissect an easily-sourced, low-cost hardware implant
embedded in a standard, innocent-looking USB cable providing an attacker
with further capabilities, including among them the ability to track its
own geolocation.

Clearly, complete control of a covert computer running with full system
access can be used in a variety of network security attack scenarios
that need to be accounted for in your threat model. We'll discuss
applicable security countermeasures.

Use your newfound knowledge for good, with great power comes great
responsibility!

Bio:

Federico Lucifredi is The Ceph Storage Product Management Director at
Red Hat, formerly the Ubuntu Server PM at Canonical, and the Linux
?Systems Management Czar? at SUSE.



For further information and directions please consult the BLU Web site
http://www.blu.org

Parking:
On-Campus Free Parking (These parking lots are free after 5pm)

Due to the never-ending construction, Sloan's Hermann Garage is only
accessable via Main Street. It is a small garage without a gate, and
directly under the Sloan library. Another option is the Amherst Street/E51
lot.

All other MIT lots require permits after hours.

The closest public parking
is Kendall Center Green Garage, next to the Marriott Hotel. The entrance is
90 Broadway Street. For other parking options, see
http://web.mit.edu/facilities/transportation/parking/visitors/public_parking.html


All Cambridge parking meters use Passport by Phone:
https://www.cambridgema.gov/traffic/Parking/paybyphone
This is active on all Cambridge metered parking spaces. Meters are free
after 8PM

For further information and directions please consult the BLU Web site
http://www.blu.org

-- 
Jerry Feldman <gaf at blu.org>
Boston Linux and Unix
PGP key id:3BC1EB90
PGP Key fingerprint: 49E2 C52A FC5A A31F 8D66  C0AF 7CEA 30FC 3BC1 EB90




























































































_______________________________________________
Announce mailing list
Announce at blu.org
http://lists.blu.org/mailman/listinfo/announce