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On Mon, Aug 13, 2001 at 09:12:18PM -0400, Ron Peterson wrote: > On Mon, 13 Aug 2001, Derek D. Martin wrote: > > It seems to me that perimeter security -- limiting the traffic which > > can enter your network from unknown and untrusted parties on the > > outside to only that which is absolutely essential for your business > > or personal needs -- is an essential part of securing any site. > > Firewalls are a proven tool to accomplish this goal. I'm unable to > > imagine a reason why someone would not want to have one, given today's > > network landscape and the (lack of) ethics rampant amongst a certain > > subset of the people who hang out there. > > In an academic environment, it's difficult to advocate running a firewall, > because it involves making a value judgement about what is and isn't > acceptable. I disagree with your statement, at least in part. I agree with the notion you give as your reason, but I don't agree that your assertion follows from it. Most universities state in various documents that the computing resources of the university are for the use of the students and faculty of the university. Certainly mine did. It follows then that no more than you MUST do you want to limit the use by legitimate users, i.e. the students and faculty, who can and should be able to use those resources to obtain whatever services they need to obtain. However the institution also has a responsibility, to those same students and faculty, to ensure the availability of those computing resources that are owned by the university, which means they must protect them. Students and taxpayers spend millions of dollars each year on these computing resources, so that the students have resources on which they may study and work. And after all, if the systems are down for days because they have been compromised by malicious intruders, this also constitutes a restriction on the freedom of the users to use those computing resources that they (and we!) have paid good money for. It is the responsibility solely of the institution which owns that equipment to guarantee its availability to its users, and keeping those systems secure is an essential part of that process. As the people who own the systems, and who are responsible for maintaining those systems in a usable condition for their customers, the institution does and should have the right to set policy as to what services will be made available from those systems. Every firewall I've used, software or hardware, allows itself to be configured such that no outgoing services are blocked, but leave some/many/all incoming services blocked. For institution-owned computing assets, this is well and good. Students should be allowed via firewall policy to make any and all outgoing requests, but they should have an expectation that resources owned and managed by the institution should have necessary limits placed on what services can be PROVIDED to the Internet at large, because there are inherent and potentially grave risks in doing so. Professionals employed by the institution should manage those services, so that the institution can meet reasonable expectations of the students and faculty members for the availability of the computing resources which are necessary for them to do perform their respective functions at said institution. Now, students and faculty members will likely also have their own computing resources which are not owned by the institution, and I would agree with you here that those systems should not be firewalled but by request of the individual who owns it. Or, perhaps better yet, the institution should have a policy of filtering by default, but opening up upon request of the individual. This helps to ensure that no judgement be made about how students should or shouldn't use available resources, but with the understanding that if ill comes to those systems, it is the student's responsibility to clean up the mess. These two networks should be seperated, preferably by their own firewall. Clearly the firewall in the first scenario should be the most restrictive. The firewall between the two networks should be the next most restrictive, and the firewall between the Internet and the student's private networks should be the least restrictive, and subject to the needs and desires of the students. It should be considered a service to the students, and dispensed with as desired by the students, as you say, to avoid making a value judgement about how their systems should be used. Academia has long been one of the last bastions of personal freedom, and I'll be the last one to advocate tearing it down. But one must weigh the loss of freedom of a firewall against the loss of freedom of having your system repeatedly ravaged by intruders. On the one hand (if you use the scenario that I've laid out) you have a very limited loss of functionality, at least for students with thier own computing resources. On the other hand, you have a complete lack of availability for computing resources for ALL users of the compromised system(s) while the institution's staff repairs the damage. I think the tri-firewall option is clearly preferable to the no-firewall option for virtually everyone, and I have no trouble whatsoever advocating it. And more and more universities are agreeing with me, though unfortunately some are a lot more restrictive than I think they ought to be. -- --------------------------------------------------- Derek Martin | Unix/Linux geek ddm at pizzashack.org | GnuPG Key ID: 0x81CFE75D Retrieve my public key at http://pgp.mit.edu - Subcription/unsubscription/info requests: send e-mail with "subscribe", "unsubscribe", or "info" on the first line of the message body to discuss-request at blu.org (Subject line is ignored).
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