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On Sun, Aug 17, 2003 at 11:50:20AM -0400, Wizard wrote: > A company that I do work for, in an effort to protect itself from it's own > lusers, is considering parsing emails so that any external HREFs inside the > email point to http://localhost. They are also going to parse out all > attachments to a central intranet location, where they will be reviewed by > admins for legitimacy before being forwarded to the addressee. Can anyone > see any problems with this strategy? Aside from making lots of sh!t work for the admins, there's one big one: privacy. Everyone here knows that, regardless of who owns the computing resources, etc., people who are at work receive personal, sometimes very private, e-mail at work. If someone else is reviewing your file attachments, potentially serious problems could result. Such attachments could conceivably contain wage information, medical information, job offers, confidential business details, etc. Having attachments reviewed by persons other than the intended recipient opens up a whole messy can of law-suit worms. Depending on how large the company is, I think it really is worth pointing out that this scheme may require one or more dedicated people to review attachments. And then, the person to who they were sent still has to look at them anyway... In practical terms, the amount of time having attachments reveiwed may end up being more than the amount of man-hours spent cleaning up from a virus infestation. A better approach is something suggested here recently: identify malicious attachments at the mail server, and remove them. You can define malicious any way you like. The definition I favor is, "any attachment which is likely to contain executable or interpreted code which the target client is likely to execute." That would include windows .exe, .com, .pif, and .scr files, as well as anything containing Active X controls, or visual basic code. Did I get 'em all? As we know from experience, it is not enough to look at the extensions, or even the MIME types of such attachments. You must actually look at the attachment to see what it contains. This doesn't solve the problem for word macro viruses. You'd still need to resort to a virus scan or some other program capable of identifying word macro viruses. Or just ban MS-Office attachments, which is a solution I personally quite like, though you'll never sell the marketroids on it... -- Derek D. Martin http://www.pizzashack.org/ GPG Key ID: 0xDFBEAD02 -=-=-=-=- This message is posted from an invalid address. Replying to it will result in undeliverable mail. Sorry for the inconvenience. Thank the spammers. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://lists.blu.org/pipermail/discuss/attachments/20030817/ce82b766/attachment.sig>
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