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I just ordered my E*Trade security ID gizmo, to become an early-adopter in the overhaul about to hit online finance. Apparently the RSA Security two-factor authentication system that first became familiar to me in the halls of Digital Equipment eons ago (and/or its equivalent) is about to become a mandate for banks/brokerages right around the same time the digital-TV mandate goes into effect and eliminates another yet another old-way of doing things. I have a lot of skepticism about the direction this will likely take: what sort of waivers are these financial institutions, not known for consumer-friendliness policies, going to get from Congress once they get enough consumers to sign up for 2-factor authentication gimmicks? Will it become well-nigh impossible to get your money back if someone figures out a way to scam you or otherwise rip you off by some clever online scheme? Just thought I'd post this here because I know a lot of y'all have had to deal with those RSA keys in the past and probably in any work that you currently do on internal systems at the likes of Fidelity. The policy document in question is on a government website here: http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr101205.htm . There are (at least) two types of attacks that this policy addresses: trojan horse, aka phishing; and identity impersonation. I have found that phishing attacks have gotten clever enough to fool almost anyone. Most recently, I bought something on eBay; using information about the just-closed transaction posted publicly on their system, a hacker generated a fake email using the details of the transaction to make it look like an email that I would commonly expect to receive. I (and hopefully you) will be on the lookout for those in the future: but in this case the phishing attack worked well enough against me that I carelessly typed me eBay password into some nefarious server. Fortunately I became suspicious right afterward and changed my eBay password, but this episode put to rest any expectation that there is ANY 100%-effective way to avoid getting nailed by a phishing attack against a single-factor password authentication method. Someday someone will be able to scam me or someone I know, despite all the precautions. Identity impersonation is harder for the banks to deal with, IMHO. Humans are always the weak point in any large organization. They can be a strength in a small organization: if you've ever had an account at a small bank and visited a branch regularly, your face became known to one or more of the tellers, who would put an immediate halt to any effort by someone else to impersonate you. In a large organization, no matter what technology is deployed, there will always be a way for an attacker to call them up, claim to be you, claim that the password's been forgotten or the crypto-key failed or whatever, and get some neophyte call-center clerk to open up a hole in their system. And, of course, the next question is this: will the feds require that banks support client identity verification on platforms other than Windows? ;-) -rich
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