Relevance of PGP?

[richard.pieri-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w at public.gmane.org (Richard Pieri)]

On Jun 10, 2011, at 9:34 AM, Bill Ricker wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jun 10, 2011 at 8:12 AM, Edward Ned Harvey <blu-Z8efaSeK1ezqlBn2x/YWAg at public.gmane.org> wrote:
>> Go get a free > certificate from
> 
> a signature with a free CA cert deserves no trust - it verifies the
> email address was the email address on a certain date only.

Which for all useful purposes is useless.  This is only one step removed from the bogus certificates for Google and Amazon that were cut a few months ago.  These demonstrate the fundamental flaw in concept of certificate authorities, a flaw that we've known about for at least two decades.  Specifically: there is no mechanism to verify the CAs themselves.  There is no way to detect that a CA has been subverted or compromised.

PGP was written not to use CAs specifically for this reason.  This makes PGP a little more cumbersome to use, but makes it impervious to S/MIME's most egregious flaw.

--Rich P.