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State of Secure Boot detailed http://www.h-online.com/security/news/item/State-of-Secure-Boot-detailed-1741460.html Red Hat and Fedora developer Matthew Garrett has detailed the "range of subtle changes" that have taken place since he began working on Secure Boot support. In a blog posting, Garrett gives an overview of the current implementation. He explains that the current approach, a shim bootloader, "cunningly called 'Shim'", contains a public key under their own control and is signed by Microsoft. The shim will only boot binaries signed with the public key and allows the developers to build and sign all other binaries themselves without going back to Microsoft to get bootloaders or other components signed. Garret points out that a locked-down boot environment and signed kernel do block modified bootloaders and booting attack code, but do nothing if, for example, an attacker uses a booted kernel to launch another kernel. To ensure that doesn't happen, direct hardware access from userspace is blocked and must go through kernel modules which have been signed by a key the kernel trusts. [...] To assist other distributions, the shim will also notice if the second stage bootloader is signed with a key it doesn't recognise. If it is, users will have the option of enrolling a new key from install media and having it added to a trusted key list. There is also, now, the capability to deactivate signature validation in the shim so developers need not sign kernels they are developing; it requires a reboot and a user generated password to be activated. Delays beset the Linux Foundation's Secure Boot workaround http://www.pcworld.com/article/2015527/delays-beset-the-linux-foundations-secure-boot-workaround.html On Tuesday...James Bottomley, chair of the Linux Foundation's Technical Advisory Board, admitted that the effort was not progressing as quickly and smoothly as had been originally hoped. "We have the code for the Linux Foundation pre-bootloader in place," Bottomley wrote in a blog post. "However, there was a delay while we got access to the Microsoft signing system. "I'm still not sure what the actual problem is, but ... I suspect that the binary is signed with a generic Microsoft key instead of a specific (and revocable) key tied to the Linux Foundation," Bottomley explained. Linux Foundation support for booting Linux on Windows 8 PCs delayed http://www.zdnet.com/linux-foundation-support-for-booting-linux-on-windows-8-pcs-delayed-7000007673/ The plan was, as James Bottomley, Parallels' CTO of server virtualization and well-known Linux Kernel maintainer, explained on October 10th, 2012, to "obtain a Microsoft Key and sign a small pre-bootloader which will, in turn, chain load (without any form of signature check) a predesignated boot loader which will, in turn, boot Linux (or any other operating system)." This "pre-bootloader employ a 'present user' test to ensure that it cannot be used as a vector for any type of UEFI malware to target secure systems. [...] Bottomley...told me "We're all done and dusted with the signed contract with Microsoft and the binary ready to release. However, I've been having bizarre experiences with the Microsoft sysdev centre." Specifically, "The first time I sent the loader through, it got stuck (it still is, actually). So I sent another one through after a week or so. That actually produced a download, which I've verified is signed (by the MS UEFI key) and works, but now the Microsoft sysdev people claim it was "improperly" signed and we have to wait for them to sort it out. I've pulled the binary apart, and I think the problem is that it's not signed with a LF [Linux Foundation] specific key, it's signed by a generic one rooted in the UEFI key." I see the value in having signed boot loaders, but it seems rather problematic that Microsoft has assumed the role of keymaster over the keys that get installed into hardware manufactured by third parties, and acting as a gateway to its operating system competitors. It seems inevitable that if they don't hand over that responsibility to an independent third party, they'll likely be facing another FTC lawsuit. -Tom -- Tom Metro Venture Logic, Newton, MA, USA "Enterprise solutions through open source." Professional Profile: http://tmetro.venturelogic.com/
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