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On 07/24/2013 10:32 AM, Kent Borg wrote: > I don't know current estimations, but I would use the following > guidelines for an encryption key: > > 32-bits of entropy: stops a naive individual with a day-job > 80-bits of entropy: stops a small organization > 100-bits of entropy: stops a big organization > 128-bits of entropy: stops the NSA > 256-bits of entropy: paranoid's goal Reading a New York Times story on Snowden contacting the film maker Laura Poitras, Snowden is quoted as advising a strong passphrase: "Assume your adversary is capable of a trillion guesses a second." Interesting. So they can brute-force an entire 32-space in a fraction of a second and a 64-bit space in a bit over a half a year. But an 80-bit space can't be completely traversed in 38,000 years. Even if the NSA is really really angry and the president says to get the bastard...just 80-bits is pretty dang good. I guess I left some room for error in the above. -kb P.S. Again, estimating entropy by looking at a passphrase is a doomed exercise. The only way to know the entropy of a passphrase is to know how it was generated and count many random decisions were made driving that process.
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