[Discuss] Why the dislike of X.509?

[richard.pieri at gmail.com (Richard Pieri)]

On 8/25/2014 3:11 PM, markw at mohawksoft.com wrote:
> *Any* security infrastructure is a central point of compromise. That's the
> nature of security. You are left with either an unmanageable mess or
> forced to use or create some sort of infrastructure to manage it.

This is a gross misrepresentation. When you have a master key, theft of
the master key compromises the entire system. When you don't have master
keys, theft of a key only compromises the entity associated with that key.

You can have a manageable system without relying on master keys or key
escrow. Kerberos has been doing it for decades.


> ANY security system is vulnerable to bad actors that can gain access to
> sensitive data. With a CA on openvpn, merely regenerate your master key
> and push a new cert. When users can't connect, they have to re-validate
> and obtain a new key.

"Merely". And how, pray tell, are YOU going to know if your private root
certificate has been compromised when X.509 lacks a mechanism to detect
root certificate compromises?

-- 
Rich P.