Encryption and risk

[david-8uUts6sDVDvs2Lz0fTdYFQ at public.gmane.org (David Kramer)]

Richard Pieri wrote:
> On Oct 6, 2009, at 10:27 AM, Dan Ritter wrote:
>> Everyone seems to be ignoring the real brute force attack:
>> rubber-hose cryptanalysis.
> 
> I did not ignore it; I simply chose not to address it.  But since you  
> asked... :)
> 
> Obviously, no algorithm can be proof against a rubber hose attack.   
> Securing against rubber hoses is a matter of implementation.  One  
> possible mechanism is something similar to standard code signing  
> practice with multi-factor authentication.  The user has a pass phrase  
> (virtual key).  The site has a hard token of some sort.  That token is  
> stored in a secured area (physical key). 

In military circles, they use the phrase "Something you have, and
something you know".  Fortunately the only secure application I
developed went on SIPRNET, so once I talked to their singne-sign-on, I
didn't have to worry about security much (other than the usual
roles/groups authorization).